What does the Trump doctrine “drill, baby, drill” bring: Greek AOZ, American giants and €30 billion mega deals Washington-Athens

With strong paper the American support of its position in the promotion of Europe’s energy independence from Russia, but also in the search for new sources of energy in the Greek EEZ, Greece now claims enhanced role in the reshuffled energy mapbut also in Europe’s new security architecture.

The two-day Summit of Transatlantic Energy Cooperation in Zappeio was the most important confirmation of this American support, which constitutes Washington’s vote of confidence in Greece and proof of the active implementation of the strategic relationship between the two countries, which is gaining an ever greater not only business, but also geopolitical footprint.

OR strategic relationship between Greece and the USA it is no longer limited only to the very important defense cooperation, with the upgraded role of Souda and the other military facilities offered by our country, but it also extends to new dynamic fields, such as energy and infrastructure, which concern major strategic choices of the United States and the West.

A process that makes Greece a key player in this new setting, while at the same time offering opportunities to large Greek companies in the energy, construction, shipping and service sectors to develop joint actions with corresponding American companies, and indeed with the support of the American state.

Strategic plans

For Greece, it is extremely important that this upgrade of its role, in terms of the strategic and energy plans of the US and the West, strengthens its diplomatic and political position and can be a strong bulwark against external schemes that could disrupt or endanger these big energy plans.

The Greek government should focus its efforts in this direction, so that these major agreements are translated into strengthening the country’s armor, with the support of strong alliances for the protection of “common interests”.

The framework in which this collaboration now operates includes:

■ The development of the Vertical Gas Corridor for LNG transportation to Central and Eastern Europe, with initial ports of entry Revythoussa and the FSRU of Alexandroupoli. A plan that in its development will require new major infrastructures with the cooperation of powerful American business groups and Greek companies in the energy and construction sectors, but also the active presence of Greek-owned commercial shipping that has invested in LNG transport ships in time.

■ ExxonMobil’s involvement in the exploitation of Block 2, west of Corfu, with the acquisition of a majority stake in the specific plot and the planning of drilling in the immediate future.

■ The revival and re-warming of the “3+1” scheme with a scope of action in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has a strong geopolitical dimension, as it aims to connect Asia – Europe through Israel – Cyprus – Greece and the preparation of the necessary infrastructure for the implementation of the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Corridor).

The situation is extremely favorable for Greece. The full prevalence of the Trump doctrine “Drill, baby, drill” and the setback of the “green transition” have led to a re-emergence of the oil giants, who, after the embarrassment of the last few years, are coming back vigorously seeking to secure access to new fields, as long as the policy of “abandonment” of the hydrocarbons.

Test drilling

ExxonMobil did not enter Block 2 by chance, but only after studies of the results of explorations carried out in the area (by TGS) provided evidence of the existence of a significant natural gas field. Its true size and commercial exploitation remain, of course, to be proven by test drilling, which the oil giant has undertaken to carry out by 2027.

It is not yet known whether ExxonMobil’s entry into Block 2 will affect its planning to start test drilling in the fields southwest of Crete, or whether there will be planning for Crete to follow the Ionian.

Certainly, ExxonMobil’s sudden move provokes the reflexes of Chevron’s great competitor, which now has every reason to speed up the procedures for the surveys in the plots southeast of Crete.

ExxonMobil has shown that it is pursuing a strong presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the existing as well as exploratory deposits can meet the energy needs of the region, which for countries like Egypt is of great importance for their stability, and at the same time be an alternative source of energy for Europe.

Last week, ExxonMobil announced the start of exploration on an Egyptian plot adjacent to the large Zohr field, right on the demarcation line of the EEZ between Egypt and Cyprus. It had already announced in July the discovery of a second natural gas field, “Pegasos I”, in Plot 10 of the Cypriot EEZ.

The Vertical Corridor

The Vertical Corridor is of great geopolitical importance, as it is a reliable alternative source of energy for Central and Eastern Europe, with great potential to increase the passing amount of natural gas that will reach Greece in the form of LNG.

However, with Greece’s dynamic entry into the LNG market, not only its energy security is ensured, but also the sharing of costs for the maintenance and expansion of networks and infrastructure. This, as market players point out, also has positive consequences in maintaining lower energy prices for domestic consumption.

As for the revival of the “3+1” cooperation, this is an important step that comes at the dawn of the end of the war in Gaza, in a period that is expected to signal – albeit with several obstacles – Israel’s return to regional cooperation, which is a key pursuit of American President Donald Trump.

The four Ministers of Energy Stavros Papastavrou, Giorgos Papanastasiou, Eli Cohen and Chris Wright sent a very positive message for the cooperation of the countries in the energy development of the Eastern Mediterranean, as a factor not only for the energy security of the region, but also as a possible alternative source of energy for Europe.

Also of particular importance is the support of the United States, which undertook to publicize and the joint statement of the “3+1” figure in the interconnection projects, which may have focused on IMEC, but also concern the implementation of the agreement to sell Israeli natural gas to Egypt, while also covering electrical interconnections, first of all the GSI cable, which remains frozen due to differences at the regulatory level, but mainly due to the geopolitical risk arising from Turkey’s negative attitude.

It is interesting, however, that the Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen not only reaffirmed his support for the electrical interconnection, but also brought back to the public debate the possibility of reconsidering the study of a natural gas pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean to Greece, in a revival of the EastMed project, which had been given a free shot by the previous US administration in 2022, citing its non-economic viability. but also the geopolitical reactions that were manifested by Turkey at that time as well.

Turkey

The Prime Minister’s clear report Kyriakou Mitsotakisthe day before yesterday, Friday, from Zappeio’s platform, with which he addressed both the American ministers and his European counterparts, he highlighted the hole that remains open for breaking the embargo on Russian natural gas with the tolerance shown towards Turkey.

“We must impose the ban; we cannot let Russian oil enter Europe through the back door, through Turkey,” the prime minister said.

Turkey, with the undersea pipeline TurkStream (capacity 31.5 billion cubic meters per year), planned in 2016 and commissioned in 2020, sought to strengthen its position as an energy transfer hub to Europe by also channeling Russian natural gas, in addition to gas from Azerbaijan reaching Europe via TANAR.

This project was also an ambitious plan of Moscow to have a second exit to Europe and to become independent from Ukraine, through whose territory the existing pipelines passed. Turkey also receives Russian natural gas from the smaller capacity Blue Stream pipeline (16 billion cubic meters per year).

Turkey, with the TurkStream pipeline, has secured large quantities of natural gas for its internal needs at preferential prices and at the same time secures significant profits from the transit fees of Russian natural gas.

Despite the restrictions imposed on the import of Russian natural gas due to the war in Ukraine and the sanctions promoted by the United States under the Trump presidency in order to deprive the Russian war machine of important resources, Turkey continues to this day to benefit from this transaction with Moscow.

From the beginning of the year until July, 12.7 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas had been transferred to Turkey, showing an increase of 26.4% compared to the corresponding period of 2024, while until October, an amount of 13 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas was transferred through TurkStream. In 2024, total Russian natural gas exports to Turkey amounted to 21.5 billion cubic meters.

Turkey, however, has attempted to anticipate the developments and take a position in the LNG market, both to cover its own needs and to appease possible American reactions regarding the maintenance, indeed at high rates, of its energy relationship with Moscow.

The pursuit of Ankara

The country already has LNG import facilities with a total capacity of 58 billion cubic meters per year, sufficient to fully meet its demand, including floating terminals at Dortiol and Saros. Its aim is to be able to re-export LNG to Europe, which would make it a regional energy hub, in addition to the role it has had until now through the pipelines that carried Azeri and Russian natural gas to its territory.

To satisfy the US side as well, state energy company BOTAS in September signed a 20-year contract with Mercuria to import about 4 billion cubic meters of US LNG annually from 2026. At the same time, it also signed a preliminary agreement with Australia’s Woodside Energy to supply about 5.8 billion cubic meters of LNG over nine years, starting from 2030.