Handrays and smile scenes shared by leaders Narendra Monti, Vladimir Putin and Si Jing During the recently completed summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin, headlines have become headlines in the western press, mainly formulating the concentration based on the message it sent to the United States and their allies.
Specifically, the blow from the sharp shift to US foreign and economic policy under President Donald Trump has remodeled the motives of the three leaders, Narendra Monti, Vladimir Putin and host Si Jing. However, a closer reading reveals that the perspective of the involvement has not done much to mitigate the cracks between the three countries – and that the meeting included much more than a simple response to Trump’s diplomatic and financial challenges, according to the specialized German Institute.
A typical example is Russia and India, two countries that maintain close diplomatic relations over time. Their cooperation is based on strong historical ties and the absence of fundamental conflicts of interest. However, in recent years the bilateral relationship has been tensions. Moscow has openly expressed its dissatisfaction with the growing approach of New Delhi with Washington. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been aligned with Chinese rhetoric, describing the Indo-Machine strategy as an artificial geopolitical form and criticizing India’s involvement in the four-day alliance-the security scheme consisting of the US and the US.
At the same time, India is trying to keep a subtle balance in its policy against the war in Ukraine. Unlike Chinese President Xi Jing, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Monti visited Ukraine and maintains close contact with Volodimir Zelenski in an attempt to boost India’s profile as a power that talks to all sides. New Delhi is increasingly concerned about the growing proximity and Moscow’s dependence on Beijing. A deeply integrated Russia is considered harmful to India’s strategic interests in the Eurasian inland – and, in fact, even for Washington’s interests. The deepening of the Moscow -Islamabad cooperation is being particularly concerned about the new Delhi, with a typical example being the Russian statement last year in favor of Pakistan’s integration into the BRICS. In this light, maintaining strong links with Russia is no longer just an option, but a strategic check for India.
Russia considers India as an important partner in Asia and as a balancer against China
However, the economic relationship of India -Russia has clear boundaries, while the West is still a critical partner for the achievement of India’s development and strategic goals. In this context, New Delhi is called upon to adopt a balanced foreign policy, especially since relations with China remain strained. On the other hand, Russia sees India as an important partner in Asia and as a counterweight to China’s growing influence in the region.
China’s position in relation to both India and Russia is anything but simple. According to Chinese analysts, Beijing never saw India’s integration into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) an integration that was achieved thanks to the pressure of Russian diplomacy. The Sino-Russian agreement included the Pakistani accession of the integration, which reflects the underlying strategic suspicion between Moscow and Beijing. Similar examples of competition are also recorded in other regional initiatives. Although Beijing does not want Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, it has expressed concerns about how Russian actions affect China’s relations with the West.
The differences become even more evident when one examines mutual involvement in their geopolitical “neighborhoods”. The deepening of Russia -North Korea cooperation is indicative. The 2024 Integrated Corporate Relationship Treaty provides for military and other aid “with all available means” in the event of a war due to external attack. This agreement marked a qualitative upgrading of Russian-North Korean relations, limiting the Chinese influence on Pyongyang and creating a dynamic that Beijing does not want-neither Cold War military bloc, nor any additional regional instability. At the same time, while China has reinforced its position in Central Asia, Russian economic influence in areas traditionally considered a sphere of influence is a declining course.
Despite these differences, the common strategic desire for border stability and the intention of challenging the world order under American hegemony leads to a deepening of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. This, however, does not negate the existing friction, nor the concerns raised on both sides about the impact of their policies on the other side’s interests. From Moscow’s perspective, in particular, asymmetry of power with China – at economic and military levels – is a possible friction point in the long run.
Power asymmetry also characterizes the India -China relationship, the third and perhaps more fragile side of the triangle. After decades of tension after the 1962 war, the two countries ended up in 1988 in an informal mechanism of management of their disputes, following a visit by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing. The agreement envisaged the decline of border dispute and cooperation in other areas, at a time dominated by American monopoly and the economic balance between the two countries were more homogeneous.
Today, however, the economic and strategic asymmetry between Beijing and New Delhi is evident. Differences in the sizes of economies and resources available – especially in times of crisis or warfare – are now decisive. At the same time, external players such as the US and Russia have a catalytic effect on shaping the bilateral relationship. This context was the background of the recent meeting between the leaders of the two countries in Tianjin.
It should be noted, however, that the present phase of the Sino-Indian relationships starts from a very low basis. The bloody conflicts in East Landak in 2020 caused significant deterioration in relationships, leading to chronic painful negotiations on declining. The process of releasing the troops was completed only at the end of 2024, paving the way for the Monti -Si meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan. It followed a careful and gradual process of re -entry.
Despite the progress, the situation remains fragile. There are still no direct flights between India and China, and the movements of persons are still extremely limited. Both sides maintain strong military forces at the border, without any substantial progress in talks for returning to the barracks. The most important result of the diplomatic mobility after Kazan was recorded during the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang to New Delhi in August 2025, when new border and financial dialogue mechanisms were announced. Nevertheless, “regularity” in bilateral relations is still far from.
From an Indian point of view, the recent meeting in Tianjin was not intended to create a new relationship of trust with China – especially amidst the US friction due to duties and the Washington – Islamabads. On the contrary, the aim was to determine the boundaries of an unstable relationship with a powerful and uncertain neighbor.
New Delhi knows that there are significant differences between the two sides on issues ranging from border talks to trade and terrorism. They reflect a deeper, more structural difference in each strategic goals of each: China wants multipolarity in the world. New Delhi agrees, but subject to the prejudice that a multipolar Asia must continue. Solving this broader divergence in worldviews will require chronic patient commitment, a process that may be delayed or discontinued at any time if there are further conflicts at the border or trade. Given this, it would be a big mistake to consider the Monty -Si meeting this week just as a response to Trump and his duties.