THE Evangelos Venizelos It exerts ‘caustic’ criticism through a post in the institutional manipulations of the parliamentary majority in debate in the Houseto set up a preliminary committee, in the case OPECEPE.
Referring to previous cases (2008–2009) and citing specific provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure, the former President PASOK and Professor of Constitutional Law points out institutional derogations and procedural acrobatics which, as he points out, affect institutional legitimacy and raise questions about the internal cohesion of the government.
For the attitude of the government compared to the past: “The parliamentary majority of the New Democracy in 2008–2009 left three times. The then Speaker of the House, Dimitris Sioufas, accepted the position of the opposition, respecting Article 67 of the Rules of Procedure. “
For today’s government choice: “Today’s parliamentary majority did not want to follow either ‘Triantopoulos / Karamanlis’ model, nor to leave, as in the period 2008–2009, nor to allow its Members to vote consciously.”
For the decision not to participate in the MPs in the secret ballot: “It forbade its Members from participating in person and consciously in secret ballot and put them under suffocating control, tackling the institutional role of the MP of the fellowship.”
For the use of a letter of vote: “He violated the provision of Article 70A of the House of Representatives. In this way the forecast of letter vote. “
For the legal invalidity of the procedure: “Only 83 Members of Parliament involved the conditions for a valid decision. The vote is invalid and the sentences remain pending. “
For the attitude of the bureau: “The Speaker of the House was absent. The blow to the prestige of the House Bureau is unfortunately great. “
For the political consequences: “The institutional and political costs for the government would be much lower than the cost of the image of the institutions recorded.”
For the deepest cause and conclusions: “The common denominator seems to be the crisis of internal trust and confidence despite the persistent. But such a crisis is almost automatically legalized. “
The whole Venizelos post
Eligibility of institutions due to legalization crisis – comment on parliamentary decline
The parliamentary majority of the New Democracy in 2008 -2009 left three times (two for the Vatopedi case and one for the Pavlidis case) from House meetings that were proposed for the establishment of a Special Parliamentary Committee for a preliminary examination under Article 86 (3). B Cons. All three times the audit of the procedure has come to the present opposition MPs and no secret ballot was carried out because at least 151 MPs were not present, that is to say, the majority of the Constitution. The proposals for the establishment of a preliminary examination committee were not rejected but remained pending. The then Speaker of the House of Representatives Dimitris Sioufas, present at the headquarters himself, accepted the position of the opposition, respecting Article 67 of the House of Representatives.
The current parliamentary majority of the New Democracy, that is, its leadership, in the OPEKEPE case did not want to follow the expression of “Triantopoulos / Karamanlis” in its own expression, that is, the establishment of a preliminary examination committee that, in a summary procedure, referred to the Court of Justice, misdemeanor of the breach of duty.
He did not want to leave during the previous 2008-2009 period, leaving the proposals for the establishment of a preliminary committee pending, fearing their possible return to it or in the next parliamentary period.
She did not even want to let her Members of Parliament participate in person and consciously in the secret ballot, fearing the number of leaks that could question her cohesion.
In the face of this impasse, the leadership of the ruling party chose not only the glaring violations of the Constitution and the Rules of the House but the multiple echo of institutions:
First, it banned its Members from joining in person and consciously in secret ballot and put them under suffocating control by lifting the institutional role of the MP of the fellowship.
Secondly, it violated the provision of Article 70A of the House Regulation which provides for the possibility of a Member of Parliament in the vote by letter only when he is involved in a government or House mission abroad or a pregnancy or pregnancy state or when there are restrictions due to pandemic. It thus enlisted the provision for letter vote.
Thirdly, he tried to artificially construct the conditions that must be met for the valid decision by the House, considering that they consist of a quorum of at least 75 Members under Article 67 Council. But Article 67 Const. It does not provide for a quorum for the House meeting but a minimum number of votes required for a decision, where no more constitutional provision does not provide for a greater number, ie increased majority over the entire number of Members. Such a provision, in particular, in Article 67, is Article 86 (3) which requires an absolute majority of the entire number of Members (151/300). However, despite the effort, only 83 MPs were involved in the vote, so the conditions for a valid decision were not met for which at least 151 and not at least 75 Members were met. In this way it was invalid to vote and inaccurate to the conclusion that the proposals for the establishment of a preliminary examination committee were allegedly rejected. The proposals remain pending until they are voted in accordance with the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the House.
Fourthly, he brought the Speaker of the House in an extremely difficult position and led him to a flamboyant absence of the whole process whose responsibility is institutional. He therefore led the Presidential Vice -President and former Minister of Rural Development in a raw violations of Article 67 (7) of the House of Representatives as he refused to vote the objection raised by PASOK and supported by the opposition, in his opposition. This is not on the childish reason that there were 90 MPs in the room who did not exist in the next minute because the opposition left protesting! In addition to the minutes of the House and in the audiovisual material of the meeting, a number of violations of the provisions of Article 73 of the House of Representatives governing the conduct of a secret ballot was recorded. The blow to the prestige of the House Bureau is unfortunately great.
I wonder, for what reason there was that this extreme dissemination of parliament? The government majority could normally participate in the vote and the proposals will not garner 151 positive votes and be rejected at least with some leaks of votes of MPs. The institutional and political costs for the government would be much lower than the cost of the image of the institutions recorded yesterday. The government majority could also- extreme and marginal scenario- declare that it is far from voting with its MPs refusing to participate in secret ballot but remain present at the meeting to make the procedural decisions to be made without any violations. Of course, the fundamental guarantee of the voting of the MP would certainly be violated, and in a similar judicial procedure in which Members are not allowed to be brought under conditions of iron party discipline.
If all this is a demonstration of absolute indifference to the constitutional framework of the House, the situation is institutionally slippery. If all this is the result of political fear for the cohesion of the majority, the creepy problem is not addressed by such high -political costs. If the move from the “Triantopoulos / Karamanlis model” to yesterday’s model means that now there is no longer the basic comfort of declaring confidence in the “natural judge” of the special court, then things may have a depth still visible to the naked eye.
The common denominator seems to be the crisis of internal trust and confidence despite the persistent. Such a crisis, however, becomes almost automatically legalized.