Infrastructure investments, which could also be of military importance, in addition to politics are in the “bazaar” ongoing in the ongoing Brussels In relation to the exact terms of activation of the national escape clause to increase expenditure defense.
This is reported to Newsit.gr circles with the knowledge of the ongoing negotiations in the capital of the Commission (Brussels), adding that proposals like the above are in particular the countries of the European South, and more specifically, Spain, Italy and Greece.
And this is because countries such as Greece already have high defense costs as a percentage of GDP (3.1% in 2024), due to its particular regional conditions and its giant borders, and may not want to exploit all the fiscal space which can result through the activation of the GDP. (since this rate corresponds to an increase in defense spending) for the sake of increasing defense spending, but which would have resulted in losing the ability to move measures of wider social appeal, such as income interventions.
The same sources report that The Greek side may have wished to use 0.5% (as a percentage of GDP) of the escape clause to increase defense spending and leave the other 1% (on GDP) for other “uses”.
The above percentages are not only… accidental as Greece is 1 percentage unit ahead of the lower ceiling set by NATO, ie 2%.
So he could argue to the EU that after he has already covered NATO ceiling, he must “retroactively” be “rewarded” by recognizing Brussels the opportunity to use this difference of 1% of GDP in other directions.
Regarding the quantitative dimension of the above percentages, the same sources specify that the white Bible layout that speaks of a reference year in 2021 is not only about the fact that after 2021 there were increases in defense spending in most European countries (due to the war in Ukraine in Ukraine, but also in the Ukraine in Ukraine). -As a percentage of GDP from 2025 until 2028 -it will be calculated on the basis of GDP of 2021.
This is lowering the bar of the potential fiscal space, as Greece’s GDP in 2021 is far less than 2024 (181 billion euros versus € 242 billion).
Further, the same sources point out that the other element that measures is not the quantitative increase in defense spending in 2025 – 2028 (on an annual basis), but if it is “translated” to an increase as a percentage of GDP (up to 1.5% to exclude the deficit).
At this point another negotiation is in progress and this concerns what these (non -defensive) “directions” may be.
The primary for Athens seems to be the implementation of citizens’ relief measures, such as tax cuts.
However, Brussels do not seem to be very willing to accept the exhaustion of any fiscal space only given to Athens (that is, to all social measures) and thus enter the table and other ideas such as entering the package that will result from the exception of defensive costs, Improving the level of living of citizens, such as the creation of new jobs in the wider industry (eg shipyards) etc.
It should be emphasized that the idea like this is not entirely “new”, as Germany has been discussing the opportunity to include defense spending and infrastructure investment in the past.
After all, it is not just a coincidence that the package voted by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on March 18 – 21 provides a double constitutional (!) Reform: First the unlimited and indefinite lending capability for defensive reasons and secondly to set up a 500 -year -olds. Euro next 12 years!
It is left to see where German investment will be directed to infrastructure and how Berlin will justify them in the Commission to use the escape clause for defense spending.
Returning to… Athens, the same sources say there is another open issue and this is nothing more than the funding of these investments.
The White Paper (except for the defense escape clause) also provides for the establishment of a European Fund 150 billion. Euro for investment for the same reason, which will be automatically eligible based on national escape saying.
Required for Greece and other indebted countries of the European South is the use of these resources to increase defense spending rather than borrowing from international markets.
For example, borrowing from the European Investment Bank has a near -zero rate, although even better for countries, such as Greece, it would be to obtain resources from the NSRF (ie non -borrowing funds) through the redirection of its available funds.
Concerning the time in which all of the above will be clarified, the same sources say that the “late April” deadline for submitting requests from EU member states in order to activate the escape clause must not be taken for granted.
The extraordinary meeting of the EU Defense Ministers on April 2-3 is critical, but it is the European Council of EU leaders, which has the power to decide the final framework of the escape clause.
In order to be able to submit the aforementioned requests at the end of April, an emergency European Council will have to meet earlier, which is a bit difficult as Easter holidays (April 13th, 2025), which is common to Orthodox and Catholics this year. As for the Regular European Council, it is scheduled for the end of June, the day before the NATO Summit.