A systematic quote of the observations of the former President of the Republic and academic Prokopis Pavlopoulou at the event organized by the Center for European Constitutional Law – Themistocles Foundation and Dimitris Tsatsou, in collaboration with the Law Library, ” On the occasion of the issuance of the Constitutional Law Manual of Spyros Vlachopoulos and Xenophon Kontiadis:
The key points of the speech of the former President of the Republic are as follows:
“For many years, unfortunately, I have observed years – and, of course, I am not the only one in our scientific community, but every other, but here I exclusively express my fixed legal views – an extremely worrying tendency and attitude of all three powers, and especially the executive. It is the tendency and attitude to deal with the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Constitution not so much as a process which, in its institutional nature, is intended to defend their regulatory activation in practice in practice. But rather as a means of regulating a regulatory boxing of their political choices from time to time and, on the other, unsuccessfully disguised institutional disintegration through increased standardized power arrangements. Something that, with no doubt, obviously distorts the regulatory constitution of the Constitution as a fundamental law – at the basis of the basis and peak of the legal order – on the predictable bed of the uninhabited or artificially admitted, in the occasion, in the occasion, intentions and their intentions.
I. Certainly, the phenomenon of such a deformation is not new, anything else. It looks at the past, distant and recent, with a variety of forms and manifestations and corresponding tensions. But it has acquired endemic, literally, dimensions in the context of the Greek legal order, except for the explosion of the dramatic economic crisis from 2010 onwards, and continues with an undiminished – perhaps reinforced – persistence to date. Unfortunately, it is not heralded that something can be changed in the near future, and I wish I could be denied.
A. In particular, and in order to deal with the above-mentioned requirements of extremely painful measures to get out of the financial crisis and under the Caucasian tribalists of the economic rule on the institutional-communion imposed by the reckless and the most incorrect as a peculiar almost non -binding regulatory text. And in particular not so much as a fundamental law, whose requirements must guide the footsteps of legislative and executive power, under the guarantee of intervention by personal and functional independence of judicial executives in the field of the distinction of powers, the rule of law and the rule of law. But much more as an institutional instrument intended to give the necessary regulatory prestige to fulfill the conditions under conditions, according to the above, government aspirations with a political horizon to get out of the economic crisis.
B. In fact, the formerly forced and in the last familiar to the pursuit of the fulfillment of the above government pursuits through the Constitution has taken, or even in the integer, the following quotation form: the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Constitution, in the enactment of the constitution, methods of teleological, grammar and systematic interpretation. On the contrary, the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the Constitution is attempted, by a government – and often, unfortunately, with the auxiliary of justice – so that its pursuits and their corresponding choices are carried out in a way that an institutionally appropriate Sykis regulatory sheet can cover them. And, after all, to cultivate with every political price, the illusion of the recipients of the unconstitutional legislative regulations that the pretexts of the rule of law and the principle of legality are kept diligently in accordance with the basic proceedings of representative democracy.
II. In practice, the institutional degeneration of the provisions of the Constitution with the ultimate purpose and purpose of their pursuits of their pursuits, which concludes their progressive regulatory shrinkage, has been the basis of two ways. Of which the latter mainly affects the institutional prestige of the provisions and that of the regulatory role of the Constitution.
A. The first way is, in the opposite extent, to the method of in Concreto interpretation and application of the applicable provisions of the Constitution not in their letter and spirit, but in the aspirations of political officials and, in the end, in the purposes of their decisions. It is obvious that this method, in terms of the control of the constitutionality of the executive of the Constitution, in order to adapt to government aspirations, concludes, through a manifestly deformed interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, not of course in a genuine control of constitutionality but of a constitutional control of constitutionality, but by the constitutional control of constitutional, It must be added, and even with particular emphasis, and that in order to make it possible for the pre -memored realization by the regulatory path of the aspirations of the political authorities, through the distorted as a consonant with the legislative regulations of the Constitutional and the Constitutional Constitution. Partnership of justice officials. Whose corresponding facility in this case has been found several times in the past and today. It is extremely characteristic of the completely recent example of the control of the constitutionality of the provisions of laws, which have been adopted on the status of selection of members and the responsibilities of independent authorities, and in particular constitutionally guaranteed, such as e.g. The National Council of Broadcasting (ESR) and the Authority of Confidential Communications (ADAE). And the aforementioned judicial assistance with regard to the fulfillment of government aspirations by shrinking the regulatory content of the Constitution has reached such a point that when the unconstitutionality of the legislative regulations in question and legislative regulations is not converted and cannot be rendered. That is, the competent authority – even the highest – reference to the admissibility of the type of rejection of the remedy or average, with the most common reason for the lack of the required personnel, direct and injectable interest. So that, allegedly, the corresponding remedy or medium does not actually convert into an act Popularis.
B. And the second way goes back to the direct intervention on the regulatory framework of the Constitution through its revision of its provisions not because their regulatory content had not been successfully adopted in terms of ratio constitutionis, but simply because their arrangements were not interpreted with the most performed by of the leaders of the executive, with other words of the Prime Minister and the Government, in the field of pursuing the satisfaction of their political goals and purpose. To this end, it is clearly and directly, recently part of the legal scientific community, when it hastens to interpret provisions of laws and regulatory acts not on the basis of the current Constitution but by what is, according to government announcements, to occur after its forthcoming revision. It is a completely inappropriate or even provocative method of interpreting the Constitution based on its “expectation of review”. Method that leads, with even greater risk, not only towards further regulatory shrinkage of the Constitution but even to the obvious regulatory marginalization of.”
Watch the video of the event here